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GROUNDWATER LAW IN THE GREAT LAKES
STATES: A LAWYER'S CATALOG FOR THE
BENEFIT OF WATER PLANNERS*
ROBERT H. ABRAMS**
I. INTRODUCTION

Water is a precious resource. Nineteenth century cases that
feature water use disputes provide a legal chronicle of America's
westward expansion and the importance of water in the arid West. For
example, in Power v. People, the defendant in a murder prosecution
claimed justification when the decedent had interfered with the
murderer's water supply. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the
key issue was whether the homicide was "justifiable or unlawful. ... "
Upholding the conviction, the court noted that, "[h]uman blood is more
precious than water, even in this thirsty land. '
The Great Lakes region, of course, is not the thirsty land of the
arid American West, but the reflexively intoned axiom remains the
same: water is a precious resource. And while the importance of water
rights to their holder has probably never been suggested as justification
for homicide in the Great Lakes region, there are numerous indicia that
water rights are of single importance in this region. Of primary concern
are the various laws that govern the allocation and use of water.
Virtually every Great Lakes state has its own rich history of judicially
resolved water disputes. These disputes have occasioned the generation
of a common law of waters and water rights which are often
supplemented by statutes. Not only s this true for surface waters, it is
also true for groundwater. It is the groundwater resource that this
article addresses.

* This article is adapted from a speech delivered to the Annual Meeting of the Great
Lakes Commission on May 12, 1992. The introductory section above was added for
publication.
** Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law.
1. 28 P. 1121 (1892).
2. Id. at 1124.
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II. THE FRAMEWORK: THE RELATIONSHIP OF WATER LAW
To WATER USE

The common law of water rights constitutes a prescription for
water use planning. The law created private entitlements regarding the
use and benefit derived from water and, in conjunction with economic
and developmental conditions of the time, spawned generally predictable
patterns of water use. For purposes of illustration, consider the
following analogy to tax law as a prescription for economic improvement:
The tax code is a major instrument of fiscal policy and as such, changes
in the law alter patterns of economic behavior. By the same token, any
given water code, whether common law or statutory, is a major
instrument of developmental policy. Here too, changes in water law
effect changes in water use.
This line of analysis, whereby behavior is shaped by (or at least
significantly shaped by) law, has some useful consequences. First and
foremost, the law/planning linkage suggests that law can be used to
improve outcomes. To whatever extent the current patterns of water use
are suboptimal, changes in law should be able to induce increases in
water use efficiency.3 Second, and of more immediate relevance, there
is a predictive capacity to the law/behavior nexus. By analyzing the law
and the expected water utilization responses, conflicts over water use
can be foreseen and avoided. Alternatively, to the extent that steps are
not taken to avoid predicted conflicts, the occurrence of these conflicts
demonstrates the existence of an instrumental relationship.
More specifically, if the governing groundwater law relies on a rule
of capture to create a legal entitlement, as did the traditional common
law of most Great Lakes states," the advent of low-cost, high-capacity
pump technology foreshadows an era of water supply crisis for the
traditional groundwater users of the region. Both the terms and the
logic of this prediction require some explication.

3. In approaching this issue, the needs and desires of the entrepreneurial class in
regard to water use have been stressed as the driving force behind changes in water
law. See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in
American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CmH. L. REV. 248 (1973). Courts and legislatures
have recognized the social benefits of improved water utilization and have modified
the law accordingly. This is sometimes termed an instrumentalist thesis: water law
is deliberately modified as an instrument of economic policy. See, e.g. Robert H.
Abrams, Chartingthe Course of Riparianism:An InstrumentalistTheory of Change,
35 WAYNE L. REv. 1381 (1989).
4. Today, groundwater law of the majority of the Great Lakes states is better
described as based on a sharing rule. See infra Appendix A.
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A. The Rule of Capture
First of all, a "rule of capture" describes a legal regime in which
property rights are recognized only after the "fugitive" resource is
captured. An obvious example of the rule of capture can be seen in
regards to the hunting of wild animals. The animals become the
property of the hunter only after capture. In the groundwater area, a
rule of capture treats the water in the ground as unowned until someone
"captures" it by pumping the water to the surface where it can be put to
use.
Applying a rule of capture to groundwater has two important
consequences. First, a capture rule creates incentives to pump. The
benefits that accrue to the pumper from the water's use are realized only
upon capture and can be lost if someone else pumps or captures the
water first. Second, a capture rule insulates the pumper from potential
liability for damage done to others who might have sought to make use
of that same water. The rule applies even if the captured water is
drained from beneath a neighbor's land. The water does not legally
belong to the neighbor because he or she did not capture the water,
which leaves them without a legally cognizable injury to their property.
Turning to the behavioral and predictive side, contextual facts
become important. During the pre-World War II era, high capacity
pumps were very expensive and beyond the economic reach of all but the
most highly capitalized water-using entities. Stated affirmatively, only
cities and industries were likely to have the economic ability to use high
capacity wells. Moreover, given the importance of water-based transit
in the patterns of regional settlement, most major cities and industries
in the Great Lakes region were located adjacent to major surface
waterways and, therefore, were unlikely to be dependent on
groundwater.
A contrasting pattern was seen in the humid East along the
Atlantic seaboard where the upstream reach of tidal saltwater rendered
local surface waterways unsuitable as supply sources. Seaboard cities
turned to groundwater far earlier than any of their Great Lakes
counterparts. Not surprisingly, there are a number of late 19th century
cases involving suits against rural well field operations of major
seaboard cites brought by the local groundwater users whose wells were
failing in competition with the high capacity wells of the cities. Under
an unadorned rule of capture, the locals lost to the cities.
To the extent that this result was politically unpalata. inequitable,
based on the cost bear cities, courts and legislatures adopted different
legal rules. Plainly, water use by the cities was more important and
therefore, the adaptive pattern was, in effect, to create a liability rule.
The cities were allowed the water, but they were required to compensate
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for the dislocations and losses that they caused. Most often this was
done by creating a legal barrier to the transportation of water away
from its place of capture, while clothing the cities with the power of
extra-territorial condemnation to secure a necessary water supply.
In the humid Great Lakes region, most of the dispersed low-value,
high-volume water uses were primarily related to agriculture and
livestock and were likely to rely on rainfall and surface water sources to
meet their water needs. This resulted in very little high-volume
pumping Prior to 1950, almost all groundwater used in the Great Lakes
region was for dispersed domestic use occurring beyond the service areas
of the urban and suburban water supply networks. In hydrogeological
terms, domestic wells seldom had a significant cone of depression.' This
meant that most groundwater users posed little threat of interference
with neighboring wells. In that context, there was little likelihood of
user conflicts, and therefore, a rule of capture carried no risk of
significant adverse consequences.
Viewed prospectively, it is plausible that a relative decrease in the
cost of high-volume pumping could have a disruptive effect on a state
that has maintained a rule of capture as its groundwater law. The
incorporation of new technology could create the potential for new high
capacity wells which would cause a spate of well interference cases in
areas where the cone of depression from high capacity wells would draw
the water table below the bottom holes of neighboring wells, thereby
causing well failures.6 This situation has already occurred, particularly
in areas where farming entities have begun to irrigate with groundwater
drawn from high capacity wells.'
Returning to the manager's role, the issues raised by the foregoing
analysis are twofold. First, in areas of the Great Lakes region where
groundwater use conflicts have become acute and the common law rule
5. A "cone of depression" describes the pattern resulting from a lowering of the water
table as water is pumped from a well. The shape is generally conical, centered at the
bottom hole of the well. The steepness of the sides of the depression is determined
by factors that include the permeability of the aquifer and the rate at which water
is withdrawn. Pamela K Smith, Coercionand GroundwaterManagement:Three Core
Studies and a "Market"Approach,16 ENVTL. L. 797, 804 (1983).
6. Well interference is distinguishable from overdraft of the aquifer. In the former
case, the problem is localized and the aggregate of the total drafts on the aquifer are
not in excess of recharge. In the latter case, withdrawals aquifer-wide are in excess
of recharge and the water table beneath the entire aquifer is falling, causing failures
of shallow wells wherever they are located and increasing pump lifts for all users.
See generally,JOSEPH L. SAX, ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, 392-428

(2d ed. 1991).
7. See, e.g., Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd
on othergrounds, 767 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1985).
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of capture is no longer providing socially desirable results, changes in
law must be considered and, hopefully, implemented. Second, in areas
of the Great Lakes region where groundwater use conflicts have not yet
been manifested, an adequate inventory of groundwater resources and
demands for use must be compiled. Planning such as this would allow
predictions of trouble areas and the development of proactive legal
changes to preterminate unnecessary user conflict.'
III. A LAWYER'S VIEW OF GROUNDWATER LAW
A lawyer's description of Great Lakes region groundwater law
begins with a summary of the common law rules applied in American
courts. Based on the legal principle of precedent, these rules have
evolved over a long period of time. Precedent develops as courts review
similar cases decided in the past, discern the reasoning behind those
decisions, distill the general principles, and then apply those principles
to decide new cases that arise within an environment that may have
changed due to social and technological advancements.
The common law governing groundwater in the United States has
three basic models from which quite divergent lines of common law have
grown. One line of common law cases views groundwater as a fugitive
resource, similar to wild animals, that is transformed into private
property by the act of capture. A second line of common law cases treats
groundwater as a common pool resource, somewhat like surface water
in riparian jurisdictions, where all of the overlying owners have a shared
interest and user rights in the groundwater resource. The third
doctrinal strand, the only one not represented in the Great Lakes region,
treats water like a flow resource, analogous to the annual flow of a
stream in the arid West, and assigns rights to those who capture. This
model allows resolution of conflicts among competing users according to
the temporal priority in the initiation of use. When a shortage occurs,
the later initiated users are totally halted to allow the more "senior in
time" users their full historic use of the water.
The groundwater rules that are applied in the Great Lakes basin
vary from state to state, however rules of shared control are applied in
a majority of the states." More specifically, a rule of sharing means that
the law creates an entitlement that courts will protect in favor of
allowing concurrent uses of an aquifer's water to be made by all
8. I am operating on an implicit premise that the vast majority of predicted regional
groundwater problems will be of the well interference variety and not of the aquiferwide overdraft variety. This assertion has a strong basis in fact. See Abrams, supra
note 3, at 1423, 1427.
9. See Infra Appendix A.
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overlying owners. If there is a conflict, such as where there is not
enough water to fulfill all of the uses in question, then any or all of the
uses will be adjusted in order to continue the legitimate uses of as many
of the overlying owners as possible while bringing total use into line.
In marked contrast, a capture rule, rather than leading to sharing,
simply inquires whether the use of the physically superior user (the
stronger pump and/or deeper well) is a proper one, and, if so, leaves the
injured party without a remedy. However, both of these rules are
subject to change by statute.
IV. A PLANNER'S VIEW OF THE COMMON LAW OF
GROUNDWATER IN GREAT LAKES STATES

Even a cursory analysis of common law doctrine indicates that the
common law is unresponsive to the planner's needs. The common law
is reactive, not proactive. Common law decisions, especially those that
are generated by applying rules of sharing, are unpredictable and the
litigation involved in obtaining a ruling is often both expensive and
fraught with delay.
V. A SIMPLIFIED VIEW OF PLANNING AND THE LAW'S RESPONSIVENESS

In an effort to encapsulate a complex process, resource
management can be described as having three essential stages:
obtaining a catalog of the resources that are subject to management;
identifying the problems that are occurring and likely to occur; and
planning for future patterns of resource use that will minimize the
problems and maximize the benefits obtained from the resource under
review.
The Great Lakes region uses groundwater in a variety of ways.
The bulk of regional uses are devoted to four major categories: domestic,
irrigation, mining, and support of surface flows. The groundwater
resources of the region are generally adequate to meet those and other
needs. At the present time, groundwater use conflicts and problems are
limited to a fairly small number of well interference disputes,
acknowledged areas of subregional overdraft, and pollution.
Looking ahead at possible regional scenarios and the groundwater
issues and problems that they will bring, I anticipate greater use of
groundwater for irrigation, resulting in more well interference due to an
increased use of high capacity wells. I anticipate that continued
population growth in areas adjacent to the metropolitan regions will
result in greater reliance on drinking water wells, creating increased
concerns for groundwater quality in areas that are in transition from
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agriculture to residential classifications. To the extent that a decline in
urbanization is taking place near Chicago and Milwaukee, in the
overdraft areas just west and south of Lake Michigan, the strain on
aquifers will increase. Aquifer storage and recovery (ASR), will become
attractive in overdraft areas, especially in light of the substantial
sources of surface water available in the region which could be added to
the groundwater supply by augmenting natural recharge.
VI. THE INADEQUATE RESPONSE OF CURRENT LAW To
REGIONAL GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS
The common law, especially under capture based regimes, provides
virtually no protection against the identified problems of well
interference, overdraft, and pollution. The law isolates the challenged
uses and determines the proper use. The test of propriety is a narrow
one, demanding that the use be beneficial and not merely intended to
injure. More substantially, under the common law reasonable use
rule,"0 as opposed to the absolute ownership rule, the situs of privileged
use is limited to the overlying tract.
Minimal reflection is needed to conclude that capture rules do not
manage the resource in the planner's sense of that term. No account is
taken of the comparative importance of the uses involved, and the
outcomes follow a winner-take-all proposition that seldom will maximize
total benefits.
As a matter of doctrine, sharing regimes are more conducive to
comparative inquiries. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example,
expressly calls upon the decision maker to consider, among other things,
the nature and value of the competing uses, seeking a physical
accommodation of the uses when possible, protecting established
economies, and considering the respective loss bearing ability of the
parties to the dispute.
Even under sharing regimes, however, decisions placing limits on
destructive uses are found primarily in cases that protect established
domestic users, such as irrigators or municipalities, whose wells fail in
competition with a high-volume user. Reported decisions involving
aquifer-wide overdraft are rare and the leading cases seem to adopt
across-the-board, pro rata reductions for all users as the means of
restricting usage to the amount of dependable annual recharge. In the
eyes of these courts, the law is following the traditional maxim that

10. The term "reasonable use" is applied in almost all of the Great Lakes states as
a part of their groundwater law, however, each state has its own jurisprudence that
gives meaning to the term.
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"equality is equity." In fact, the legal doctrine that is applied to such
cases is capable of far more sophisticated allocations, but courts, in the
absence of clear policy guidance from legislatures, have not shown
themselves to be enamored with becoming de facto water allocation
agencies.
As to pollution, it seems fair to analogize groundwater pollution
to surface water pollution. Great strides have been made in regulating
point source pollution.11 In contrast, non-point source pollution,
particularly the infiltration of agri-chemicals, is still virtually
unregulated.
VII. CAN THE LAW BE MADE To SERVE?
In a perfect world, the law could anticipate future problems and
serve as a vehicle by which groundwater could be managed in ways that
would benefit the Great Lakes region. While present groundwater laws
are not extremely farsighted, they are not immutable. The common law
could evolve in ways that are better adapted to resolve the identified
problems. However, legislatures have largely unfettered authority to
revise the common law and, therefore, can have a more immediate and
direct impact on groundwater laws. Assuming that legislatures can
agree to the policy, the groundwater law of the region can be rewritten
to fit managerial prerogatives, rather than remaining as a continuation
of inherited principles and traditions.
The manner in which the law can be made to serve the needs of
regional groundwater management falls into two general categories.
The first I call legal process concerns. The thrust of this proposal
addresses the form of legal rules regarding matters such as the
appropriate administration of the laws. Even more importantly,
however, the law must also have substantive provisions that effectuate
the chosen management policies. Listed below are a few brief examples
of the principal areas that have been isolated as likely regional problems
and suggestions as to ways in which the law can be modified.
1. Well Interference Provisions: Regulation can be targeted
toward the aquifers that are the most likely candidates for
conflict based on their hydrogeologic characteristics. The
legal rules can be designed to minimize conflicts and allocate
the costs of conflict mediation. For example, the law can
choose a liability rule that requires high capacity users to pay

11. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§6901 6991 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§96019657 (1988).
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for the costs of improving or replacing the wells of small
volume users. To create an incentive to encourage small
volume users to dig adequately deep wells, the liability rule
can be limited to protecting only "qualifying' wells, i.e., wells
that meet state established or mandated standards for depth
and construction. Indiana has already established this
system of protection for qualifying wells against high capacity
well users.'
2.

Reduction of Overdraft: Rather than apply a reactive
common law legal regime, utilization of a permit system
linked to critical management areas would be a more effective
approach. The permits could seek to reduce overdraft by
requiring post-pumping technology-based water conservation
requirements. If this approach fails to conserve enough water
to reduce total use to safe annual yields, the system could be
supplemented by withdrawal fees that could be used to fund
ASR projects that increase effective supply. Not only will
ASR techniques overcome the water deficit, the fee system
imposed in this manner could add further conservation
incentives while still protecting low volume users from
excessive economic burdens.

3.

Contamination: Land use controls vis-a-vis the citing of likely
pollution sources, which are currently only intermittently
applied, should become universal. Farming entities should be
subjected to agricultural water conservation requirements
that reduce leaching. In addition, local pesticide application
regulations should be imposed to protect drinking water
aquifers."
VIII. CONCLUSION

Over the years, groundwater law in the Great Lakes region has
received little attention. Historically, the comparatively high cost of
extracting large volumes of groundwater and the relative abundance of
surface water and rainfall have limited the need for more highly
articulated groundwater laws. Given the diverse patterns of water use
and rapidly developing technological changes, a new era has developed

12. See IND. CODE ANN. §13-7-26-6 (Burns 1992).
13. Such regulation can be undertaken at the state and local level. See, Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S.Ct 2476 (1991) (ruling that the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) does not preempt local
governmental regulation of pesticide use).
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in which groundwater will become a key component in regional water
supply. Groundwater will also be deemed a precious resource; a
resource which the law must cultivate in order to support the vital needs
of society.

1993]

GROUNDWATER LAW IN GREAT LAKES STATES
APPENDIX A
A Brief Catalog of Great Lakes States and
their Governing Common Law Regarding Groundwater"

1.

Illinois

2.

Indiana

3.

Michigan

4.

Minnesota

5.

New York

6.

Ohio

7.
8.

Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

Statutory adoption of something akin to
reasonable use riparianism,"' therefore
most like correlative rights.
Modified absolute ownership, with a
statutory overlay to protect qualified wells
against well interference."
Restatement of Torts reasonable use
approach"
Absolute ownership that gave way to
correlative rights that was subsequently
supplanted by statutory administrative
permit system.'
At least partial adoption of correlative
rights'
Restatement of Torts reasonable use
approach."
Common law reasonable use approach.'
Version of the Restatement of Torts
reasonable use approach that tends toward
correlative rights"

14. See generally Earl F. Murphy, QuantitativeGroundwaterLaw in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1991); 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (Robert E.
Beck, ed., 1991).
15. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 1601 (1989).
16. See Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983); but see,
Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1985).
17. IND. CODE § 13-2-2-5 (Burns 1990).
18. See Maerz v. U. S. Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 1982).
19. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105A1 (West 1987).
20. See Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900).
21. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1521.17(B) (Pages 1991); Cline v. American
Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984).
22. See Ratherauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 14 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1940); but, see e.g.,
Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403 (Pa. 1956).
23. See State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974).

